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Abstract
In recent work, Cheu et al. (Eurocrypt 2019) proposed a protocol for n-party real
summation in the shuffle model of differential privacy with Oǫ,δ(1) error and Θ(ǫ
√
n)
one-bit messages per party. In contrast, every local model protocol for real summation
must incur error Ω(1/
√
n), and there exist protocols matching this lower bound which
require just one bit of communication per party. Whether this gap in number of
messages is necessary was left open by Cheu et al.
In this note we show a protocol with Oǫ,δ(1) error and Oǫ,δ(log(n)) messages of size
O(log(n)). This protocol is based on the work of Ishai et al. (FOCS 2006) showing how
to implement distributed summation from secure shuffling, and the observation that
this allows simulating the Laplace mechanism in the shuffle model.
A remark on concurrent work
Concurrently and independently of our work, Ghazi et al. [4] obtained a similar algorithm to
ours. However, there are two differences with our work that are worth stating. First, they
rediscovered the algorithm from Ishai et al [7] to obtain secure summation from secure shuf-
fling, and proved slightly different guarantees for it using different techniques. The second
difference is in the employed distributed noise aggregation scheme: while Ghazi et al. rely
on a similar technique to the one used by Shi et al. [8], we exploit the infinite divisibility
properties of the geometric distribution, as suggested by Goryczka and Xiong [5]. Quanti-
tatively, these differences lead to improvements over the result of Ghazi et al.: the error of
our protocol is independent of δ, saving a factor of O(
√
log(1/δ)), and the communication
complexity is independent of ǫ saving a factor of O(log(1/ǫ)) in the number of messages.
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1 Preliminaries
The shuffle model. The shuffle model of differential privacy [3, 2] considers a data col-
lector that receives messages from n users (possibly multiple messages from each user). The
shuffle model assumes that a mechanism is in place to provide anonymity to each of the
messages, i.e., in the curator’s view, the message have been shuffled by a random unknown
permutation.
Following the notation in [2], we define a protocol P in the shuffle model to be a pair
of algorithms P = (R,A), where R : X → Yk, and A : Ynk → O, for number of users
n < 1 and number of messages k > 1. We call R the local randomizer, Y the message
space of the protocol, A the analyzer of P, and O the output space. The overall protocol
implements a mechanism P : Xn → O as follows. Each user i holds a data record xi, to
which she applies the local randomizer to obtain a vector of messages ~yi = R(xi). The
multiset union of all nk messages yi,j is then shuffled and submitted to the analyzer. We
write S(~y1, . . . , ~yn) to denote the random shuffling step, where S : Ynk → Ynk is a shuffler
that applies a random permutation to its inputs. In summary, the output of P(x1, . . . , xn)
is given by A ◦ S ◦ Rn(~x) = A(S(R(x1), . . . ,R(xn))).
To prove privacy we will refer to the mechanismMR = S◦Rn which captures the view of
the analyzer in an execution of the protocol. Therefore we say that P is (ǫ, δ)-differentially
private if for every pair of n-tuples of inputs ~x and ~x′ differing in one co-ordinate, and every
collection T of multisets of Y of size nk, i.e. every possible subset of views of the analyzer,
we have
P(MR(~x) ∈ T ) ≤ eǫP(MR(~x′) ∈ T ) + δ.
Real summation. In this paper we are concerned with the problem of real summation
where each xi is a real number in [0, 1] and the goal of the protocol is for the analyser to
obtain a differentially private estimate of
∑n
i=1 xi.
Randomized rounding. Our proposed protocol uses a fixed point encoding of a real
number x with integer precision p > 0 and randomized rounding, which we define as
fp(x, p) = ⌊xp⌋ + Ber(xp− ⌊xp⌋).
Lemma 1.1. For any ~x ∈ Rn, MSE(∑ni=1 fp(xi, p)/p,∑ni=1 xi) ≤ n/(4p2).
Proof. Let ∆i be fp(xi, p)/p− xi, and note that |∆i| ≤ 1/p and E(∆i) = 0. It follows that
MSE
(
n∑
i=1
fp(xi, p)/p,
n∑
i=1
xi
)
= E

( n∑
i=1
∆i
)2 =
n∑
i=1
E[∆2i ] +
∑
1≤i<j≤n
(E[∆i∆j ]) =
n∑
i=1
E[∆2i ] ≤ n/(4p2).
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Differential Privacy from Statistical Distance. Our argument relies on statistical
distance which, for consistency with [7], we define as the maximal advantage of a distinguisher
A in telling two distributions X and Y apart, namely SD(X, Y ) = maxA |P(A(X) = 1) −
P(A(Y ) = 1)|. We will show that the view of the analyzer in our protocol is close in
statistical distance to the output of a differentially private mechanism. The following lemma
(also stated by Wang et al. [9], Proposition 3) says that this suffices to conclude that our
protocol is differentially private.
Lemma 1.2. Let M : I → O and M′ : I → O be protocols such that SD(M(i),M′(i)) ≤
µ(σ), for a security parameter σ and all inputs i ∈ I. If M is (ǫ, δ)-DP, then M′ is
(ǫ, δ + (1 + eǫ)µ(σ))-DP.
Proof. For any neighboring inputs i, i′ ∈ I, M satisfies P(M(i) ∈ O) ≤ eǫP(M(i′) ∈ O) + δ,
and P ′ satisfies P(M′(i) ∈ O) ∈ [P(M(i) ∈ O) − µ(σ),P(M(i) ∈ O) + µ(σ)], for any
input i and O ⊆ O. It follows that P(M′(i) ∈ O) ≤ P(M(i) ∈ O) + µ(σ) ≤ eǫP(M(i′) ∈
O) + δ + µ(σ) ≤ eǫ(P(M′(i′) ∈ O) + µ(σ)) + δ + µ(σ).
The Discrete Laplace In this work we use a discrete version of the Laplace mechanism,
which consists of adding a discrete random variable to the input. We refer to this distribution
as the discrete Laplace distribution. The distribution is over Z, we write it DLap(α) and it
has probability mass function proportional to α|x|. Adding noise from this distribution to a
function with sensitivity ∆ provides ǫ-differential privacy with ǫ = ∆ log(1/α), analogously
to the Laplace mechanism on R. This distribution also appeared in [8] though under the
name symmetric geometric.
2 Secure Distributed Summation
Ishai et al. [7] showed how to use anonymous communications as a building block for a variety
of tasks, including securely computing n-party summation over Zq. This setting coincides
with the shuffle model presented above, and hence the precise result by Ishai et al. can be
restated as follows (we give a detailed proof of this Lemma in Section 5).
Let P be a shuffle model protocol, and let f : I → O be a function. We say that P is
σ-secure for computing f if, for any i, j ∈ I such that f(i) = f(j), we have
SD(MR(i),MR(j)) ≤ 2−σ.
Lemma 2.1 ([7]). There exists a σ-secure protocol Π in the shuffle model for summation in
Zq with communication O(log(q)(log(qn) + σ)) per party.
The protocol by Ishai et al. is very simple. Let xi ∈ Zq be the input of the ith party.
Party i generates k = 2 + 5⌈log(q)⌉ + ⌈2σ + 2 log(n − 1)⌉ additive shares of xi (k can
be reduced by almost a factor of two as explained in section 5.1), i.e., it generates k − 1
independent uniformly random elements from Zq denoted ri,1, ..., ri,k−1 and then computes
ri,k = xi −
∑k−1
j=1 ri,j . Party i then submits each ri,j as a separate message to the shuffler.
The shuffler then shuffles all nk messages together and sends them on to the server who adds
up all the received messages and finds the result
∑n
i=1 xi as required. This is σ-secure as
stated in the lemma.
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3 Distributed Noise Addition
Given that a communication efficient protocol for secure exact integer summation in the
shuffle model exists, we would now like to use it for private real summation. Intuitively,
this task boils down to defining a local randomiser that takes a private value xi ∈ [0, 1] and
outputs a privatized value yi in the discrete domain Zq such that
∑n
i=1 yi is differentially
private and can be post-processed to a good approximation of
∑n
i=1 xi.
A simple solution is to have a designated party add the noise required in the curator
model. This is however not a satisfying solution as it does not withstand collusions and/or
dropouts. To address this. Shi et al. [8] proposed a solution where each party adds enough
noise to provide ǫ-differential privacy in the curator model with probability log(1/δ)/n, which
results in an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private protocol. However, one can do strictly better: the
total noise can be reduced by a factor of log(1/δ) if each party adds a discrete random
variable such that the sum of the contributions is exactly enough to provide ǫ-differential
privacy, and this also results in pure differential privacy. A discrete random variable with
this property is provided in [5], where it is shown that a discrete Laplace random variable
can be expressed as the sum of n differences of two Po´lya random variables (the Po´lya
distribution is a generalization of the negative binomial distribution). Concretely, if Xi and
Yi are independent Po´lya(1/n, α) random variables then Z =
∑n
i=1Xi − Yi has a discrete
Laplace distribution i.e. P(Z = k) ∝ α|k|. This allows to distribute the Laplace mechanism,
which is what we shall do in our protocol presented in the next section.
4 Private Summation
In this section we prove a lemma which says that given a secure integer summation protocol
we can construct a differentially private real summation protocol. We then combine this
lemma with Lemma 2.1 to derive a protocol, given explicitly, for differentially private real
summation.
Lemma 4.1. Given a σ-secure protocol Π in the shuffle model for n-party summation in Zq,
for any q > 0, with communication f(q, n, σ) per party, there exists an (ǫ, (1 + eǫ)2−σ−1)-
differentially private protocol in the shuffle model for real summation with standard error
Oǫ(1) and communication bounded by f(⌈2n3/2⌉, n, σ).
Proof. Let Π be (RΠ,AΠ, ). We will exhibit the resulting protocol P = (R,A), with R =
RΠ ◦ R˜ and A = A˜ ◦ AΠ, with R˜, A˜ defined as follows. P executes Π with q = ⌈2n3/2⌉,
and thus R˜ : [0, 1] 7→ Z⌈2n3/2⌉. R˜(xi) is the result of first computing a fixed-point encoding
of the input x with precision p =
√
n, and then adding noise η ∼ Polya(1/n, e−ǫ/p) −
Polya(1/n, e−ǫ/p). A˜ decodes z by returning (z − q)/p if z > 3np
2
, and z/p otherwise. This
addresses a potential underflow of the sum in Zq. To see that P has error O(1), note
that it has the accuracy of the discrete Laplace mechanism when adding integers, except
when the total noise added has magnitude greater than n/2, in which case we may incur
additional O(n) error, but this only happens with probability O(e−ǫn/2). Hence, the error of
this protocol is bounded by O(1) +O(ne−ǫn/2) = O(1).
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Algorithm 1: Analyzer An,k,p,q
Public Parameters: Number of parties n, number of messages per party k,
precision p and order q > np of the additive group.
Input: Multiset {yi}i∈[nk], with yi ∈ Z
Output: z ∈ R
Let z ←∑nki=1 yi mod q ⊲ Add all inputs mod q
if z > np+q
2
then z ← z − q ⊲ Correct for underflow
return z/p ⊲ Rescale and return estimate
Algorithm 2: Local Randomizer Rα,k,p,q
Public Parameters: Noise magnitude α, number of messages k, precision p and
order q > np of the additive group.
Input: x ∈ [0, 1]
Output: ~y ∈ [0..q − 1]k
Let x˜← ⌊xp⌋ + Ber(xp− ⌊xp⌋) ⊲ x˜ is the encoding of x with precision p
Let y ← x˜+ Polya(1/n, α)− Polya(1/n, α) ⊲ add noise to x˜
Sample ~y ← Unif([0..q − 1]k) conditioned on ∑i∈[k] yi = y
return ~y ⊲ Submit k additive shares of y
To show that this protocol is private we will compare the mechanism MR to another
mechanism MC (which can be considered to be computed in the curator model) which is
(ǫ, 0)-differentially private and such that SD(MR(~x),MC(~x)) ≤ 2−σ for all ~x, from which
the result follows by Lemma 1.2.
MC(~x) is defined to be the result of the following procedure. First apply R˜ to each input
xi, then take the sum s =
∑n
i=1 R˜(xi) and then output the result of MRΠ with first input s
and all other inputs 0.
Note that s =
∑n
i=1 fp(xi, p)+ DLap(e
−ǫ/p), and that the sensitivity of
∑n
i=1 fp(xi, p) is p.
It follows that s is (ǫ, 0)-differentially private and thus by the post processing property so is
MC .
It remains to show that SD(MR(~x),MC(~x)) ≤ 2−σ, which we will do by demonstrating
the existence of a coupling. First let the noise added to input xi by R˜ be the same in both
mechanisms and note that this results in the inputs toMΠ withinMR and the inputs toMΠ
within MC having the same sum. It then follows immediately from Lemma 2.1 that these
two instantiations of MΠ can be coupled to have identical outputs except with probability
2−σ, as required.
The choice p =
√
n was made so that the error in the discretization was the same order as
the error due to the noise added, this recovers the same order of error as the curator model.
Taking p = ω(
√
n) results in the leading term of the total error matching the curator model
at the cost of a small constant factor increase to communication.
Combining Lemmas 2.1 and 4.1 we can conclude the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. There exists an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private protocol in the shuffle model for
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real summation with Oǫ,δ(1) error and Oǫ,δ(log(n)
2) communication per party.
Such a protocol can be constructed from the proofs of these lemmas and is given explicitly
by taking the local randomiser Rα,k,p,q given in algorithm 2, and the analyzer An,k,p,q given
in algorithm 1, with parameters p =
√
n, q = ⌈2np⌉, α = e−ǫ/p and k = 2 + 5⌈log(q)⌉ +
2⌈log(1/δ) + log(n− 1)⌉. This results in a mean squared error of
2α
(1− α)2 +
n
4p2
and communication of k⌈log(q)⌉ bits per party. In section 5.1 we explain how the choice of
k and thus the required communication can actually be reduced by almost a factor of two.
5 Summation by Anonymity
In this section we provide a proof of Lemma 2.1, all the ideas for the proof are provided in [7]
but we reproduce the proof here keeping track of constants to facilitate setting parameters
of the protocol. The following definition and lemma from [6] are fundamental to why this
protocol is secure.
Let H be a family of functions mapping {0, 1}n to {0, 1}l . We say H is universal or a
universal family of hash functions if, for h selected uniformly at random from H , for every
x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, x 6= y,
P(h(x) = h(y)) = 2−l.
Lemma 5.1 (Leftover Hash Lemma (special case)). Let D ⊂ {0, 1}n, s > 0, |D| ≥ 2l+2s
and let H be a universal family of hash functions mapping n bits to l bits. Let h, d and U
be chosen independently uniformly at random from H, D and {0, 1}l respectively. Then
SD ((h, h(d)), (h, U)) ≤ 2−s
To begin with we consider the case of securely adding two uniformly random inputs
X, Y ∈ Zq. Recall that Π is the protocol of the statement of the lemma, and let V (x, y) be
shorthand forMRΠ((x, y)) = S ◦RΠ((x, y)), i.e. the view of the analyzer in an execution of
protocol Π with inputs x, y. We write V for V (X, Y ) and V (x) for V (x, Y ). Finally let U
be an independent uniformly random element of Zq.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose log
(
2k
k
) ≥ ⌈log(q)⌉+ 2s. Then, SD((V,X), (V, U)) ≤ 2−s.
Proof. For a ∈ Z2kq and π ∈
(
[2k]
k
)
let ha(π) =
∑
i∈π ai. (ha)a∈Z2kq are a universal family
of hash functions from
(
[2k]
k
)
to Zq. Let d be an independent uniformly random element
of
(
[2k]
k
)
. Note that (V, hV (d)) has the same distribution as (V,X), which follows from the
intuition that V corresponds to 2k random numbers shuffled together, and x can be obtained
by adding up k of them, and letting y be the sum of the rest.
The result now follows immediately from the fact that the Leftover Hash Lemma implies
that SD((V, hv(d)), (V, U)) ≤ 2−s.
Now we can use this to solve the case of two arbitrary inputs.
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Lemma 5.3. If x, y, x′, y′ ∈ Zq satisfy x+ y = x′ + y′, then we have
SD(V (x, y), V (x′, y′)) ≤ 2q2SD((V,X), (V, U)).
Proof. Markov’s inequality provides that
SD(V (x), V ) ≤ qSD((V,X), (V, U)) ∀x ∈ Zq
and thus by the triangle inequality
SD(V (x), V (x′)) ≤ 2qSD((V,X), (V, U)).
Note that
SD(V (x), V (x′)) =
∑
t∈Zq
SD(V (x)|Y = t− x, V (x′)|Y = t− x′)/q
=
1
q
∑
y∈Zq
SD(V (x, y), V (x′, y + x− x′))
and so for every x, y, x′ ∈ Zq and y′ = y + x− x′ we have
SD(V (x, y), V (x′, y′)) ≤ qSD(V (x), V (x′)).
Combining the last two inequalities gives the result.
Combining these two lemmas gives that, for x, y, x′, y′ ∈ Zq such that x+ y = x′ + y′,
SD(V (x, y), V (x′, y′)) ≤ 2q22−
log(2kk )−⌈log(q)⌉
2
≤ 2− k2+1+ 5⌈log(q)⌉2 (1)
From which the following lemma is immediate
Lemma 5.4. If k ≥ 2 + 5⌈log(q)⌉+ 2σ and x, y, x′, y′ ∈ Zq such that x+ y = x′ + y′ then
SD(V (x, y), V (x′, y′)) ≤ 2−σ
We will now generalize to the case of n-party summation.
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Let ~x, ~x′ ∈ Znq be two distinct possible inputs to the protocol, we say
that they are related by a basic step if they have the same sum and only differ in two entries.
It is evident that any two distinct inputs with the same sum are related by at most n − 1
basic steps. We will show that if k is taken to be 2 + 5⌈log(q)⌉+ ⌈2σ + 2 log(n− 1)⌉ and ~x
and ~x′ are related by a basic step then
SD(V (~x), V (~x′)) ≤ 2
−σ
n− 1 (2)
from which the lemma follows by the triangle inequality for statistical distance.
Let ~x and ~x′ be related by a basic step and suppose w.l.o.g. that ~x and ~x′ differ in the
first two co-ordinates. Taking k = 2 + 5⌈log(q)⌉ + ⌈2σ + 2 log(n − 1)⌉, by lemma 5.4, we
can couple the values sent by the first two parties on input ~x with the values they send on
input ~x′ so that they match with probability 1− 2−σ
n−1
. Independently of that we can couple
the inputs of the other n− 2 parties so that they always match as they each have the same
input in both cases. This gives a coupling exhibiting that equation 2 holds.
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Remark 5.1. It may seem counter intuitive to require more messages the more parties there
are (for fixed q). The addition of the log(n−1) term to k is necessary for the proof of Lemma
2.1. The is because we are trying to stop the adversary from learning a greater variety of
things when we have more parties. However it may be the case that Theorem 4.1 could follow
from a weaker guarantee than provided by Lemma 2.1 and such a property might be true
without the presence of this term.
It is an open problem to prove a lower bound greater than two on the number of messages
required to get O(1) error on real summation. A proof that one message is not enough is
given in [1].
5.1 Improving the Constants
The constants implied by this proof can be improved by using a sharper bound for
(
2k
k
)
in
inequality 1. Using the bound
(
2k
k
) ≥ 4k√
π(k+1/2)
gives that taking k to be the ceiling of the
root of
k = 1 + σ +
5⌈log(q)⌉
2
+
1
4
log(π(k +
1
2
))
suffices in the statement of Lemma 5.4. The resulting value of k is
5
2
log(q) + σ +
1
4
log(log(q) + σ) +O(1).
Adding log(n− 1) to the root before taking the ceiling gives a value of k for which Lemma
2.1 holds.
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